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Abstract
The objective of the paper is to explore the governance structure of strategic alliances created 
by small and medium enterprises in the South Moravian Region. It deeper examines contrac-
tual alliances between strategic partners with focus on the contract and also deals with the 
protection of intellectual property rights in the investigated firms. To gain data for investiga-
tion, both primary and secondary research have been applied. Within the former the main data 
collection methods were the questionnaire survey and semi-structured personal interviews. 
The overall goal of the paper is to enhance the knowledge about the creation and functioning 
of strategic alliances in the Czech Republic.
This paper is organized in the following way: first of all, the notion of strategic alliance is in-
troduced. Next, the main forms of governance structure are presented in more details. This is 
followed by the objective and the methods of research. The results present the main findings 
of the research and discuss them in broader context. The conclusions recall the main findings 
and reveal the space for further investigation. 
Key words: strategic alliance, governance structure, equity alliance, non-equity alliance, joint venture, minority 
alliance, contractual alliance, intellectual property rights, SMEs
1. INTRODUCTION
Firms have increasingly seen strategic alliances as attractive forms of cooperation through 
which they can grow and expand (Gulati & Singh, 1998). While there are plenty of studies 
dealing with strategic alliances, they may differ in definition of alliance. Commonly, alliance is 
any cooperative agreement voluntary initiated between firms that can involve “exchange, sharing 
or co-development, and it can include contributions by partners of capital, technology, or firm-specific assets” 
(Gulati & Singh, 1998, p. 781). Haas (1997) furthermore emphasises the pool of risk between 
partners and the integration of functions in order to reach the joint goals. Buzády and Tari 
(2005) note that cooperation in an alliance is principally long-term, lasting obviously more 
than one year. 
In order to remain competitive, firms must react to the signals from their environment contin-
uously. To do so, a flexible access to several tangible and intangible resources is needed, which 
is often difficult, especially in case of small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Ring and Van de 
Ven (1992, p. 483) notify that alliances represent an efficient way to keep pace, especially in 
case firms are seeking “unique and pioneering resources”. 
Thanks to globalization the creation of inter-organization connections is growing in inten-
sity. Vodáček and Vodáčková (2002) emphasise that recent strategic alliances create complex 
networks consisting of bilateral connections. They involve not only firms, their customers, 1
suppliers, investors and other stakeholders, but also organizations, as research centres and 
universities. These complex networks have undoubtedly great importance, but in order to gain 
more specific results, the attention in the research described in this paper is focused only on 
inter-firm alliances.
Previous researches has also pointed out that along with the growing number of alliances there 
is an increase in diversity. According to Gulati and Singh (1998) one of the determinants are 
the formal structures used to organize the cooperation. This topic has been a subject of numer-
ous researches (Das & Teng, 1996; Casciaro, 2003; Comino et al., 2007; Kuittinen et al., 2009). 
Parkhe (1993) sees alliance structure as a critical determinant of alliance performance. 
Research in the Czech Republic in the field of strategic alliances lags behind the Western Eu-
ropean countries in volume and results. One of the reasons is undoubtedly the lack of interest 
and activity of the SMEs. According to Zelený (2011) the problem lies in the culture of entre-
preneurship and the way entrepreneurs look at cooperation in the Czech Republic. In many 
cases the effort for self-sufficiency and the protection of know-how are preferred to creation 
of closer cooperation with the business partner. 
The investigation of alliances and other forms of cooperation based on networks is included 
in the publications of Pitra (2001), Lednický and Vaněk (2004), Skokan (2004), Mikoláš (2005), 
Nenadál (2006), Vodáček and Vodáčková (2006), Dědina and Odcházel (2007), Blažek et al. 
(2009) and others. However, the current state of knowledge in the Czech Republic still lacks 
results from researches focusing on certain aspects of alliance formation, such as the early 
stages of formation, alliance management practices, alliance performance measurement, dis-
solution of alliances. Governance structure is also one such area. 
2. ALLIANCE STRUCTURE
Alliance structure embodies a certain degree of hierarchical elements which can be character-
ized by the extent of control and coordination (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Prior research influenced 
primarily by transaction cost theory have focused in great deal on the appropriation concerns 
in alliances originating from contracting obstacles and pervasive behavioural uncertainty. The 
researchers have observed that the greater the appropriation concerns, the more hierarchical 
the governance structure of the future alliance tend to be enabling hierarchical controls in the 
form of control by fiat, monitoring and alignment of incentives. 
Thanks to the variety of organization structures firms face numerous possibilities in structur-
ing their alliance. In relation with this variety there is an incoherrence among researchers in 
determination of what alliance is. Some of them (Vodáček & Vodáčková, 2006) consider alli-
ance in its most narrow sense only cooperation without any share of equity. Others (Buzády 
& Tari, 2005), include also cooperation with minority equity share between firms. The widest 
definition of alliance involves common equity of partners – joint venture (Das & Teng, 1998; 
Gulati & Singh, 1998; Arino, 2003; Child, 2005; Comino et al., 2007). The author of the paper 
follows the latter way of understanding alliance. Journal of  Competitiveness  1
2.1 Determinants of alliance structure
Scholars in previous researches have distinguished and studied several determinants of alli-
ance structure. The most frequent of them are the followings:
the volume of anticipated coordination costs at the time of alliance formation -  the greater 
the volume of anticipated coordination costs, the more hierarchical the governance struc-
ture was (Gulati & Singh, 1998);
the complexity of arrangements – they are related with the anticipated coordination costs 
of cooperation; the higher the complexity the higher the anticipated coordination costs of 
the alliance (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Dent, 2003); 
repeated ties between the partners – repeated ties diminish hierarchical controls in alli-
ances (Gulati & Singh, 1998);
the existence of prior dealings or a social network between the parties – previous relations 
between the parties can reduce moral hazard problems and diminish hierarchical controls 
in alliances (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Dent, 2003).
Careful investigation of these determinants by the parties should result in a proper alliance 
governance structure design. 
2.2 Classifying governance structures
Researchers have distinguished dimensions of hierarchical control in distinct types of allianc-
es, where each of them can be characterized by specific levels and forms of command structure 
and authority systems, standard operating procedures, incentive systems, dispute resolution 
procedures, etc. (Gulati & Singh, 1998).
Non-equity or contractual alliances
Contractual alliances are similar to arms-length market exchanges in sense of the independ-
ency of the parties and their equal basis for business (Gulati and Singh, 1998). Partner firms 
work together directly from their own organization without equity share or unification under 
common ownership. Activities are coordinated jointly and the decisions are made by negotia-
tions among the partners. Wang and Nicholas (2007) acknowledge that contractual alliances 
are characteristic for the openness and flexibility of contracts allowing the negotiation of terms 
and conditions between the partners continuously. They can be established quickly as a reac-
tion to a concrete need or business opportunity and dissolved after completion the negotiated 
objective. Moreover, the transaction costs of entering and exiting the contractual alliance are 
reduced which can be of a special importance for SMEs. 
Minority alliances
According to the degree of hierarchical control, minority alliances represent the middle of the 
spectrum. Cooperating partners take minority equity position in the other (or others) to estab-
lish more precise coordination and control than it is obvious in contractual alliances. However, 
these efforts are relatively limited as – according to Gulati and Singh (1998, p. 792) – these 
investments “typically do not have a separate organization and administrative structure”.  
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Joint ventures
Gulati and Singh (1998) rank joint ventures to end of the hierarchical spectrum. Firms create 
a separate entity in which each partner owns a portion of the equity. On the strategic level 
joint ventures are governed by a board of directors, which is composed of members from all 
partner firms (Sampson, 2003). Moreover, joint ventures can be characterized by autonomous 
command structure and authority system as day-to-day operation is overseen by independent 
managers. This highly hierarchical organization requires clearly defined rules and responsibili-
ties and the establishment of incentive systems and dispute resolution systems (Gulati & Singh, 
1998). The drawback of high level coordination and control are especially the costs of such 
mechanisms. Therefore  Sampson (2003) suggests establishing joint ventures only in case the 
alliance activities require more substantial coordination and control. Tab. 1 summarizes the 
main forms of inter-firm cooperation, from ordinary contracts to joint ventures, and repre-
sents them in order according to the degree of cooperation and control. 
Tab. 1 – The main forms of interfirm cooperation. Source: the author based upon Buzády & 
Tari (2005) and Wang & Nicholas (2007, p. 134) 
Main forms of inter-firm 
cooperation
Contract attributes Theoretical nature
Ordinary contracts as buy-
ing and selling contracts, 
ordinary subcontract-
ing,  framework contracts, 
processing and assembling 
contracts 
Especially short-term con-
tracts lacking any compo-
nent of permanent, strategi-
cally important cooperation
arm’s length contracts
Contractual alliances
Firms work together on a 
range of projects, the activi-
ties are jointly coordinated 
and decisions are made by 
negotiations.
non-equity alliances, uni-
directional or bidirectional 
agreements, high rate of 
strategic flexibility
Minority alliances
Firms own minority equity 
in their partner organiza-
tions obviously without crea-
tion of joint organization 
and administrative structure. 
equity-based alliances 
without unified governance, 
medium rate of strategic 
flexibility
Joint ventures
Firms create a separate 
entity in which each partner 
owns a portion of equity 
characterized by independ-
ent command structure and 
authority system. 
equity-based alliances with 
unified governance, low rate 
of strategic flexibilityJournal of  Competitiveness  1
From this typology mergers and acquisitions were left out intentionally, as these structures do 
not allow for the legal and functional independence of all parties. 
2.3 Problems in cooperation coordination
Despite the potential benefits of cooperation within a strategic alliance, there are substantial 
barriers to scrutinize. Therefore, allying firms should find the balance in allocating their re-
sources between their own organization and the partner(s) (Haas, 1997). 
Sampson (2003) formulates three main problems in the field of cooperation coordination the 
firms entering strategic alliances face. First of all, there are considerable moral hazard problems 
since partner’s behaviour is often unforeseen. Moreover, equal contribution of partners to the 
alliance activities is difficult to control and the costs of their opportunism may be high. This 
can bear particular importance in alliance with uncertain outcomes or where firms undertake 
complex activities requiring high-end technologies. Second, there is the risk of unintended 
transfer of the firm’s most valuable assets to partners, arising from the imperfect protection 
of intellectual property rights. These assets are those which can distinguish the firm from its 
competitors, such as technologies, product specifications, techniques, information about mar-
kets and customers, key strategies and business practices or other forms of knowledge. Last, 
differing managerial methods, strategic interests and expectations of partners can manifold 
the difficulties of alliance cooperation coordination.  
Sampson (2003) notifies that there is a means to deal with cooperation coordination problems 
– the alliance structure. Formal structure is a means enabling to set out partner rights and 
obligations, define and follow alliance goals, and provides a framework for decision making 
and problem solution. The author emphasizes that even if not all embedded in the contract 
and inner rules is legally enforceable, thorough planning of alliance structure may reduce the 
occurrence of misunderstandings and activities which are out of line with the alliance goals. 
3. OBJECTIVE AND METHODS
The objective of the paper is to explore the governance structure of strategic alliances created 
by SMEs in the South Moravian Region. It deeper examines contractual alliances between stra-
tegic partners with focus on the contract. As during cooperation there is a risk of unintended 
transfer of knowledge and technology between partners (Sampson, 2003) it also deals with 
the protection of intellectual property rights in the investigated firms. Dent (2003) notes that 
business organization and contract terms, as well as the allocation of property rights should be 
a part of any serious examination of alliances. The overall goal of the paper is to enhance the 
knowledge about the creation and functioning of strategic alliances in the Czech Republic.
In order to explore the characteristic features of strategic alliances in the Czech Republic, 
both qualitative and quantitative research methods were applied. The basic sample consisted 
of SMEs from the South Moravian region. The common feature of these firms was that they 
carry out R&D in the Czech Republic within their primary or secondary activities “irrespective 
to number of employees, sector of performance and economic activity” (Czech Statistical Office, 2011, p. 
1). The dataset creates a part of the Czech Statistical Office database (2010) and contains 637 
firms – SMEs. 1
Within the framework of quantitative research a questionnaire survey has been conducted 
among these firms. The minimum required sample size has been calculated according to Saun-
ders et al. (2007, p. 613–614) and has been estimated to 66 at 95 % confidence level and 5 % 
margin of error. In order to obtain a representative sample the self-selection sampling tech-
nique has been used. From the given dataset 401 firms were contacted by telephone, e-mail or 
both of them between November 2010 and January 2011. There were three rounds of contact-
ing at all. The active response rate was 33 % (for more details see Tab. 2). The questions in the 
questionnaire were organized into several blocks according to topic, starting with basic in-
formation of firms, followed by characteristics of strategic alliance and governance structure, 
closing with overall evaluation of cooperation. 
Tab. 2 – Response rate. Source: author
Means of data 
collection
Number of con-
tacted firms
Number of completed 
questionnaries
Response rate 
(%)
Telephone 105 40 38
E-mail 296 92 31
Total 401 132 33
Within the framework of qualitative research three firms from the sample were deeper ques-
tioned about certain features of strategic partnership with an aim to verify the information 
gained from the questionnaire, to explain some of these information more thoroughly and to 
expand the overall knowledge about strategic cooperation. The interviews were conducted in 
March 2011 with the top managers or directors of the firms in a length of about 45 minutes. 
During these personal meetings semi-structured questionnaire was used in order to ensure the 
comparability of results. The business names of firms in this article are omitted. According 
to the firm law of English-speaking countries, two of them are limited firms, and the third 
one is a joint-stock firm. For more information see Tab. 3. In the paper the outcomes of these 
interviews has only complementary function, they are presented very briefly giving additional 
proof to the questionnaire research findings or to comment some of the results.  
Tab. 3 – Personal interviews – overview of firms’ basic information. Source: author
Firm
Legal 
form
Size
Branch of 
business
Type of 
business
Number of 
strategic partners
Cooperation 
with 
competitors
Firm A plc small ICT services more than  3 yes
Firm B Ltd. micro ICT services 2, exceptionally 3 yes
Firm C Ltd. small
machinery 
industry
services 2, exceptionally 3 yes
Besides primary research a great emphasise was put also on the secondary research drawing 
upon research papers from electronic databases, books, annual reports, organizations’ web-
pages and the author’s previous research papers.Journal of  Competitiveness  1
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
From the selected sample of 132 firms the ones with at least one strategic business relation were 
filtered out. These firms were further questioned about the details of strategic cooperation 
with regard also to the governance structure and its details.
4.1 Governance structure of strategic alliances of investigated firms
Following the governance structure categorization in chapter 2.2, respondents could mark the 
most characteristic type(s) of formal organization of their strategic cooperation. They could 
choose one or more characteristic structure from: contractual alliance, minority alliance and 
joint venture. The category of contractual alliances has been further divided into two sub-
categories: oral agreements and written contracts, as both can be used in practise in the Czech 
Republic (Tab. 4).
Tab. 4 – Governance structure of strategic alliances of investigated SMEs. Source: author
Governance structure
Sample
Relative frequency (%) 
Contractual alliances – oral agreements 30,5
Contractual alliances – written contracts 84,2
Minority alliance 7,4
Joint venture 6,3
Total 128,4
Number of respondents 95
According to the results, the dominance of contractual relationships is evident. More than 84 
% of firms sign written contract with strategic business partners. Furthermore, nearly a third 
of respondents cooperate under oral agreement. The two other forms of governance structure 
– minority alliance and joint venture – are not really widespread. The former is present at 7,4 % 
of firms and the latter at 6,3 %. These results are in accordance with Pitra’s (2001) observation, 
that the most obvious form of strategic alliance is contractual relationship. 
Taking a closer look on the results, it is found that 16 % of firms do not apply written contracts 
at all. Further investigation has shown that 88 % of these firms create strategic alliances based 
only on oral agreements. This finding tells about a very precious and sophisticated level of 
strategic relationship (Zelený, 2011) being characteristic only for 14 % of responding firms. It 
is based on a very high level of trust and has very loose structure. The personal interview with 
firm C gave further support to this finding.
4.2 Contractual alliances between investigated firms
As written contracts dominate in the formal structure of investigated firms, the survey focused 
on the contractual alliances in more details. Respondents who cooperate under contracts could 
choose from the most typical contract types applied in cooperation as: partnership agreement, 
contract for work, agency contract, license agreement or other. In case of different practice 
firms could add their own answers. 1
According to the results 78,8 % of respondents sign partnership agreements. These contracts 
allow for the creation of either loose formal base or expressed structure of cooperation. The 
second most preferred type of contracts are contracts for work – 48,8 % of firms declared their 
application. The proportion of firms which have experience with license agreements and agen-
cy agreements is rather low, 16,3 % and 11,3 %. For more detailed information see Tab. 5. 
Tab. 5 – The most preferred types of written contracts. Source: author
Types of contracts
Sample
Relative frequency (%)
Partnership agreement 78,8
Contract for work 48,8
License agreement 16,3
Agency agreement 11,3
Other 5,0
Total 160
Number of respondents 80
The 5 % of respondents having chosen the “other” category revealed the application of ad-
ditional contract types, as contract for software development, framework agreement and con-
tract of sale. 
These results were difficult to compare with findings of similar researches, as a significant 
part of these works investigate the relation between costs of cooperation and the governance 
structure, or analyze the content of contracts in greater details than it was possible within this 
research. Moreover, contract types and business practices in this field can be also country 
specific. 
4.3 The degree of control and coordination in investigated firms
The strength of ties within strategic alliance members is a very important factor. It can reveal 
additional information about the mutual trust of parties, the position of parties within the alli-
ance, and their practices. Firms had to determine the degree to which written contracts specify 
the parties’ rights and obligations. According to the “strength” of the contracts the following 
three types were distinguished:
contracts with free specification of rights and obligations of the parties,
contracts with express specification of rights and obligations of the parties,
contracts with express specification of rights and obligations of the parties containing 
terms of penalty for cases of breaching the contractual obligations.
Respondents could choose more than one characteristic answer. Tab. 6 provides an overview 
of the results. 

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Tab. 6 – Types of contracts according to the degree of specification. Source: author
Degree of specification
Sample
Relative frequency (%)
Free specification 16,3
Express specification 43,8
Express specification containing terms of penalty  48,8
Total 108,8
Number of respondents 80
Among respondents declaring the use of contracts, as many as 92,6 % apply contracts with 
express conditions. Moreover, nearly a half of these firms have terms of penalty embedded in 
the contract. This makes 45 % of the total number of described contract types. 
Only 16 % of firms prefer looser contracts creating solely the rough framework of cooperation 
with the strategic partner. This group of respondents apply only this type of contract. Ac-
cording to the director of firm B, the most important part of such contract is the termination 
provision. 
43 % of firms use only contracts with embedded terms of penalty. The relatively frequent ap-
plication of this type of contracts may reflect one or more possible situations: the application 
of standard practise in the firm, the complexity of the tasks within cooperation and also the 
lack of trust between business partners.
4.4 Intellectual property protection in the investigated firms
When analyzing strategic cooperation from legal point of view, there is one important and 
complex area which should not be forgotten – the intellectual property rights. While coopera-
tion with the partner or partners gets stronger and deeper, the firms’ core competencies, stra-
tegic plans, methods and processes, information databases etc. can be partly exposed, which 
means a potential risk of abuse. This risk is especially evident in cases, when firms have only a 
relatively short cooperation history prior to the strategic alliance (Gulati & Singh, 1998). 
In some cases the protection of intellectual property rights is a prerequisite of building deeper 
inter-firm relationships. Unfortunately, the framework of this research did not allow to make 
deeper investigations in this field. Its goal was only to find out whether firms engaged in stra-
tegic cooperation protect their IPL in form of patents, utility models, industrial designs and 
trademarks. 
In their answers nearly two-thirds of respondents confirmed the protection of intellectual 
property at least with one of the most frequent means of protection (see Fig. 1). This relatively 
high proportion could result from the research and development profile of these firms.
Fig. 1 – Existence of intellectual property protection in investigated firms. Source: author
37% 
63%
Yes 
No11
According to the statistical information published by the Czech Industrial Property Office 
(2011), the proportions can be only presumed. On country level trademarks make 54 %, pat-
ents 31 %, utility models 10 % and industrial design 5 % from the main means of protection.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Governance structure of strategic alliances can be an important factor determining the success 
of cooperation. Even though there is a heterogeneity in previous researches about which fac-
tors affect the choice of a certain formal structure the most, one point is clear: careful planning 
is inevitable (Reuer et al., 2006). The strategic importance of cooperation, the complexity and 
resource intensity of tasks, the existence of previous contact between partners, or the costs of 
finding the suitable alliance partner may influence the design of the governance structure of 
future cooperation. In spite this topic is widely discussed in the papers of foreign researchers, 
there is a lack of information from the Czech Republic. Therefore this paper aimed to explore 
the strategic alliances of SMEs located in the South Moravian Region. The common feature 
of these firms was the carry-out of research and development as primary or secondary activity. 
The research focused on the preferred governance structure, the types of and rigidity of ap-
plied contracts and the protection of intellectual property. 
The results have proved the dominance of contractual alliances in case of 97,9 % of firms. The 
set-up of equity alliances – minority alliances and joint ventures – has been found only in case 
of 7,4 %, respectively 6,3  % of SMEs. Within contractual alliances based on written contracts 
the application of partnership agreements and contracts for work were the most preferred ways 
of cooperation formalization (used by 78,8 %, respectively 48,8 % of firms). License agree-
ments were declared only in 16,3 % of firms. The interview with firm A revealed that license 
agreements are often used as supplementary contract to contracts for work.
Investigating the details of applied contracts in alliances, the dominance of express contracts 
has been revealed (in case of 84 % of respondents). Moreover, 48,8 % of the firms embed 
penalty provisions into contracts. On contrary 16 % of firms cooperate solely under loose con-
tracts lacking express specification of rights and obligations of partners. As several researchers 
have stressed, firms should devote a great attention to setting the rules of cooperation and to 
the contract design (Dent, 2003; Sampson, 2003).
Another important aspect of strategic cooperation is the relative risk of unwanted reveal of 
core competencies, information and technologies. Therefore, the protection of intellectual 
property should be carefully considered in the course of alliance formation. Within the inves-
tigated sample of firms 63 % of them have declared the ownership of patents, utility models, 
industrial designs or trademarks as means of protection. Considering the focus of these firms 
on research and development, this protection can bear high importance. 
In this place it is important to note that the presented research has several limitations. First 
of all, instead of covering the whole country, only the South Moravian Region has been inves-
tigated. In spite of this the author of the paper believes, this way has enabled to collect more 
complex data from one location enabling the gain of more coherent knowledge about these 
cooperative relationships. Second, there was an attempt to analyze the applied contracts in 
more details. Unfortunately, the scope of this research did not allow deeper investigation of the Journal of  Competitiveness  1
contract details as terms of cooperation, coordination and control mechanisms, termination 
and confidentiality provisions, restrictions on proprietary information, the value of penalty 
and other features. The results have proved the dominance of specified contracts between 
firms, therefore there is a large space for further research in this area. Last, although the pro-
tection of intellectual property is highly important in case of strategic cooperation, the scope 
of research allowed only for gaining information about the existence of protection. It lacks the 
analyze of concrete means of protection and their embeddedness in strategic business relations 
giving space also for future research. 
In spite of the limitations the research described in this paper has revealed specific informa-
tion about governance structure of strategic alliances in the Czech Republic. The author has 
contributed to the creation of a more concrete picture and emphasizes the importance of 
structure creation.  Moreover, the findings can provide SMEs with information about current 
business practices and encourage the ones who do business “alone” to consider the opportu-
nity of closer cooperation with a business partner. This is one of the ways of increasing firms’ 
competitiveness in the domestic and foreign markets and the overall competitiveness of the 
Czech Republic. Baťa (1936, p. 131) states,  “...cooperation is a noble competition heading to only goal: 
the improvement of human, the improvement of society, the improvement of firms and the avoidance of losses by 
integration and harmonization of individual potentials.“
Development in the field of inter-firm cooperation toward more valuable and intensive rela-
tions brings higher quality and different dimension into the recent business relations. Pitra 
(2001) notifies that while traditional organization structure is suitable for following clearly set 
strategic goals in a relatively stable environment, it is inefficient in changing conditions. The 
author further points out that firms which are able to abandon the classical model of manage-
ment hierarchy and choose looser organization structure, are also able to react more efficiently 
to the turbulences in their environment. But as Reuer et al. (2006) emphasise, in order to 
achieve these benefits entrepreneurs have to pay attention to the initial conditions of alliance 
formation and to the processes within alliance-management. Therefore the design of govern-
ance structure is one of the most important tasks of alliance members. 
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